Is an information warfare unit of the Navy responsible for the Pentagon’s recent UFO “disclosures”?
This is the disturbing possibility that emerges from analysis of email correspondence obtained through FOIA from the US Navy. The emails first obtained by the Black Vault, reveal the central role played by the Navy Office of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Information Warfare, known as N2N6, in managing and communicating information related to Unidentified Aerial Phenomena (UAPs) to the American public.
The emails show that N2N6 exercises complete control over the dissemination of UFO-related information to American audiences on behalf of the Pentagon. Well beyond the typically decentralized process established by DoD Directive 5400.07, N2N6 appears to have the authority to direct other divisions in the DoD in responding to media inquiries and FOIA requests about UAPs. N2N6 has even required other divisions of the DoD to coordinate with N2N6 prior to public release of any UAP-related information. N2N6 was the office that issued a Security Classification Guidance document addressing the UAP issue and determining what information can be publicly shared. The emails also show that N2N6 reviewed UAP videos for classification purposes and authorized their release.
Joseph Gradisher, a prominent figure in the emails analyzed, was a high-ranking official within N2N6 who, on the front end, directly engaged with major media outlets such as Time, NBC, and USA Today and provided official statements for at least six UAP-related articles published by US-based media outlets.
On the backend, Gradisher was central in managing and communicating UAP-related information to American audiences via official channels. In an email dated September 1, 2020, Gradisher himself approved a final response to one of the FOIA requests, after reviewing it with Sue Gough, a public affairs officer at OSD PA. He says “press on with the response as you proposed”, implying some decision-making power on the issue. N2N6 was not the originating classification authority, but somehow had the authority to order release anyway.
In another email dated June 16, 2020, Gradisher is asked by a NAWCAD Command Operations Group member for assistance in tracking down the history and custody of the UAP videos, again implying Gradisher had some authority or knowledge over the matter. The email states that “the request is asking for records regarding the history and custody of the UAP videos…Do you know what squadron/fleet the videos were under? Who should I refer this FOIA request to?” And in another email from November 2020, Gradisher instructed the Naval Safety Center and Navy Newsdesk Director to redirect all media inquiries regarding UAPs to N2N6 and Sue Gough.
Gradisher’s apparent authority to coordinate and approve releases of information specifically related to UAPs/UFOs extended beyond the Navy to include elements of the Air Force as well. For example, he has been instrumental in handling FOIA requests related to UAP videos investigated by AFOSI between 2017 and 2018. His detailed response to a FOIA request in June 2020, along with consultations with key individuals like Jay Stratton, then Director of N2N6F (Integrated Fires and Assured C2), demonstrates a curious depth of knowledge possessed by Gradisher and N2N6 regarding the UAP videos that appears to include the videos’ chain of custody and distribution across the Pentagon.
Numerous questions remain.
Why is N2N6 involved in approving information requests made to the DoD by the American public and the domestic press?
Is this a common occurrence or unique to UAP-related matters?
Is N2N6’s overt exercise in U.S. public affairs lawful?
What can be said with reasonable certainty is that central management of UAP-related information by an organization like N2N6 is consistent with a deliberate, coordinated information operation; actions that may well be inconsistent with relevant laws, regulations, and policies.
One such statute is the Smith-Mundt Act of 1948, which regulates the distribution of government-produced content intended for foreign audiences within the United States. Entities like N2N6, which are dedicated to conducting information warfare operations to influence foreign adversaries, are explicitly prohibited from directly engaging with domestic American audiences. It’s for this reason that the involvement of an information warfare unit into domestic communication channels raises serious questions about how N2N6’s activities could possibly be in compliance with existing statutory, regulatory, or constitutional limitations. N2N6’s primary mission is to influence the decision-making processes of foreign adversaries, not to engage with domestic audiences in a public affairs capacity.
As public interest in UFOs and UAPs continues to grow, there is an increasing need for transparency and accountability in how information about these phenomena is managed and disseminated. These revelations underscore the complex and concerning role of N2N6 in the UAP narrative — a combination of information warfare, media engagement, and potential civil or criminal liability.
Sources
For additional information on the sources used in this article, please refer to the following links:
http://parallaxuap.blogspot.com/2021/03/how-dod-is-keeping-tabs-on-uap-related.html
Abbreviated Findings
N2N6 approved the final response letter for FOIA request DON-NAVY-2020–007330, which stated that no records were found responsive to the request for information and records regarding the history and custody of the UAP videos. This suggests that N2N6 had oversight and authority over the release of information related to UAPs.
N2N6 provided background information on how the UAP videos ended up at PAX, which indicated that the videos were passed from the squadron and/or fleet level through ONI and on to PAX via classified networks. This suggests that N2N6 had access and involvement in the transfer and handling of UAP videos.
Joe Gradisher (N2N6) served as a point of contact for NAWCAD on FOIA requests related to UAP videos, and coordinated with other agencies such as ONI and OSD PA, suggesting had a key role in managing and communicating information related to UAPs.
In an email dated June 16, 2020, Gradisher is asked by a NAWCAD Command Operations Group member for assistance in tracking down the history and custody of the UAP videos, indicating that he has some authority or knowledge on the matter.
In another email dated June 16, 2020, Gradisher replies that he checked with Jay Stratton, the director of Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Capabilities Division (N2N6F1), to get the background on how the videos ended up at PAX, a naval air station. He also provides some details on how the videos were passed from the squadron and/or fleet level through Stratton and on to PAX via classified networks.
In an email dated September 1, 2020, Gradisher approves a final response to one of the FOIA requests, after reviewing it with Sue Gough, a public affairs officer at OSD PA. He says “press on with the response as you proposed”, implying that he has some decision-making power on the issue.
